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Κρυπτεία: A Form of Ancient Guerrilla Warfare 
The night was still, the moon hanging with translucent beauty in the blackness of the sky. Wraiths 
emerged stealthily from the shadows, swooping down upon the unsuspecting peasants on the beaten 
path. The moonlight glistened on the blades of their daggers, unsheathed only in the moment before 
the strike. Within seconds, the unaware peasants lay dead on the ground. The twisted, cloaked 
forms of men vanished without a trace into the darkness of the mountains, as quickly and silently as 
they came. They were the krypteia. 
 
Modern scholars have debated the exact nature of the Spartan krypteia 
(κρυπτεία), a group of young men who roamed the countryside killing helots. 
Some have seen it as a form of education, others as a form of suppression. However, 
not many scholars have pointed out that the krypteia was a form of guerrilla warfare 
against the helot population. The members of the krypteia were not, as some have 
presumed, youths in need of harsh, bloody education or a secret police force. Instead, 
they were elite guerrilla soldiers used to keep the helots in line, and perhaps even 
played a role in the larger Spartan military in special operations. 
 
HISTORIOGRAPHY  
Two rival schools of thought separate modern perception about the krypteia. 
One is the view that the krypteia was essentially a brutal final exam for select 
members of the agōgē, or Spartan educational system. The skills learned during this 
gruesome test would be later utilized in their militaristic lifestyle as hoplites. 
Conversely, other scholars see the educational aims of the krypteia as secondary; 
rather they presume its purpose was nothing other than a means to control the helot 
population through state-sponsored terrorism. Generally the two groups of scholars 
acknowledge both components, but they differ on which purpose has dominance. 
  Some scholars feel that the krypteia was exclusively a part of the educational 
system in Sparta. For example, T. Rutherford Harley in 1934 briefly noted that young 
men of eighteen years old joined the krypteia after intense training and the agōgē.1 
Essentially the krypteia was the next step in Spartan education according to Harley, 
while in 1956 H. Marrou took a stronger stance on the krypteia in stating that it “in 
the beginning seems to have been not so much a terrorist expedition against the 
helots as a campaign exercise designed to accustom the future combatant to the 
harsh life of ambushes and war.”2 Richard J. A. Talbert, writing over thirty years later, 
agreed with Marrou when he wrote “the purpose of the [krypteia] looks likely to have 
been much more to ‘blood’ young Spartiates than to keep down the helots.”3 Both 
                                                 
1 T. Rutherford Harley, “The Public School of Sparta,” Greece & Rome 3, no. 9 (1934): 139. 
2 H. Marrou, “Spartan Education,” in A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. G. Lamb (New York: 
Sheed & Ward Publishers, 1956), 23. 
3 Richard J. A. Talbert, “The Role of the Helots in the Class Struggle at Sparta,” Historia: Zeitschrift für 
Alte Geschichte 38, no. 1 (1989): 34. 
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Marrou and Talbert claimed that the primary purpose of the krypteia was education 
and training for the Spartan military rather than a technique of suppression. 
However, many scholars have disagreed with this assessment. Preston H. 
Epps in 1933 acknowledged that “the participation in this inhuman practice was a 
part of the Spartan system of education,” but also stated that the institution of the 
krypteia was a “system of organized assassination” that reflected the fear that 
Spartans had for the helots.4 More recently, Paul Cartledge has ascribed to the view 
that the task of the krypteia “was to control the Helots as well as prove their readiness 
for the responsibilities of warrior manhood.”5 Nino Luraghi has also seen the krypteia 
as a form of terror to keep the helots under control.6 Historians, such as Victor 
Davis Hanson, have further compared the institution to the Gestapo and called it an 
early form of secret police.7 While its purpose in the educational system was a vital 
component, in their view the krypteia was more importantly a method to control the 
helots through terror. 
When considering the nature of the krypteia and Spartan society, the latter 
group’s argumentation seems more convincing than the former. Training, while 
important to the military, is secondary to practical applications. Furthermore, if the 
krypteia was merely a final part of the agōgē, it raises the question of why it focused on 
a manner of fighting not utilized in hoplite warfare.  
 
THE NATURE OF THE KRYPTEIA: CONFRONTING THE PRIMARY SOURCES 
There is very little primary source material explicitly concerning the krypteia. 
Despite the paucity of the evidence, most scholars have not disputed the existence of 
the institution. However, given the nature of the krypteia, this is not unexpected. The 
etymology of the word is derived from κρυπτός, which means “hidden” or “secret”. 
Therefore, one does not expect a large amount of ancient evidence to exist when the 
subject by its very nature is clandestine. 
Plato presents the earliest evidence we have concerning the krypteia. Through 
a Lacedaemonian named Megillus in his Laws, Plato writes: 
 
…it is the training, widely prevalent amongst us, in hardy 
endurance of pain, by means both of manual contests and 
of robberies carried out every time at the risk of a sound 
drubbing; moreover, the krypteia, as it is called, affords a 
wonderfully severe training in hardihood, as the men go 
bare-foot in winter and sleep without coverlets and have 
                                                 
4 Preston H. Epps, “Fear in Spartan Character,” Classical Philology 28, no. 1 (1933): 22. 
5 Paul Cartledge, The Spartans: The World of the Warrior-Heroes of Ancient Greece, from Utopia to Crisis and 
Collapse (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 70. 
6 Nino Luraghi, “Helotic Slavery Reconsidered,” in Sparta: Beyond the Mirage (Oakville, CT: David 
Brown Book Co., 2002), 231. 
7 Victor Davis Hanson, Wars of the Ancient Greeks, ed. John Keegan (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1999), 80. 
2
Grand Valley Journal of History, Vol. 1 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol1/iss2/4
 
 
no attendants, but wait on themselves and rove through 
the whole countryside both by night and day.8 
Based solely on the words of Plato, there is a sense that the krypteia was merely a 
form of harsh training for the Spartans. Its nature was essentially a mountainous 
warfare/survivalist training program designed to acclimate soldiers to unforgiving 
conditions and clandestine operations. 
The only other author who mentioned the krypteia was Plutarch. The first 
instance in which Plutarch mentioned it was in Lycurgus:  
 
…It may be that Plato was likewise led to this opinion of 
Lycurgus and his constitution because of the Spartiates’ so-
called krypteia – assuming this really was one of Lycurgus’ 
institutions, as Aristotle has maintained. Its character was 
as follows.  
Periodically the overseers of the young men would 
dispatch into the countryside in different directions the 
ones who appeared to be particularly intelligent; they were 
equipped with daggers and basic rations, but nothing else. 
By day they would disperse to obscure parts in order to 
hide and rest. At night they made their way to roads and 
murdered any helot whom they caught. Frequently, too, 
they made their way through the fields, killing the helots 
who stood out for their physique and strength…Aristotle 
makes the further notable point that immediately upon 
taking office the ephors would declare war on the helots, 
so that they could be killed without pollution…personally 
I would not attribute such a foul exercise as the krypteia to 
Lycurgus…9 
With Lycurgus, the krypteia developed from a form of training found in Plato’s 
Laws to an institution centered instead on killing the helots. Part of the reason for 
this was that the Laws were written around 360 B.C.E. and Lycurgus was written in 75 
C.E.10 Plato and Plutarch also differed in their purposes. Plato wrote on laws and 
various aspects of society that influence law-giving. However, most of Plutarch’s 
works, including Lycurgus, were written to show its readers the ideal Greek role 
models in history. Therefore it is expected that the two sources would differ 
somewhat. 
According to Lycurgus, the members were selected for their intelligence and 
sparingly equipped; it must be assumed that resourcefulness in the face of scarcity 
                                                 
8 Plato, Laws, trans. R.G. Bury, 1.633 
9 Plutarch, Lycurgus, trans. Richard J. A. Talbert, 28. 
10 Daniel C. Stevenson, The Internet Classics Archive, http://classics.mit.edu. 
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must have been a virtue for the elite epheboi of the krypteia. During the day the 
members would remain hidden and conduct their terror at night. Nighttime raids are 
significant since they were a deviation from the norm; early hoplite warfare in Greece 
was limited to daylight hours.11 Sometimes the killing was random, other times it was 
a purposeful selection of helots deemed to be most of a threat. Furthermore, the 
ephors declared war on the helots annually.12 In this way, the helots could be killed 
without any legal or moral ramifications: it was an act of war. Plutarch was hesitant to 
attribute such a cruel institution as the krypteia to Lycurgus, but did not dispute the 
existence of it. If there was any question as to its existence, it would seem Plutarch 
would opt for putting the vicious rumors surrounding his beloved Lycurgus to rest 
rather than discussing the nature of the krypteia.  
Plutarch also mentions the krypteia in his Cleomenes: 
 
He showed himself an admirable general in the hour of 
peril…but he was overwhelmed by the superior character 
of his enemies’ armour and the weight of their heavy-
armed phalanx… 
For Antigonus ordered his Illyrians and Acarnanians to go 
round by a secret way and envelope the other wing…and 
then led out the rest of his forces to battle; and when 
Cleomenes, from his post of observation, could nowhere 
see the arms of the Illyrians and Acarnanians, he was afraid 
that Antigonus was using them for such purpose. 
He therefore called Damoteles, the commander of the 
secret service contingent13, and ordered him to observe 
and find out how matters stood in the rear and on the 
flanks of his array…14 
This excerpt from Cleomenes illustrates a military application of the krypteia 
that scholars have scarcely considered. Cleomenes was confronted with an enemy 
general who successfully hid the location of two units to make a flanking maneuver 
by a secret path. When faced with this serious predicament, Cleomenes turned to 
                                                 
11 Hanson, 72. 
12 Robert J. Bonner and Gertrude Smith, “Administration of Justice in Sparta,” Classical Philology 37, no. 
2 (1942): 121. Plutarch here is clearly citing the lost Constitution of the Lacedaemonians by Aristotle 
(F 538 Rose). 
13 The translator, Bernadotte Perrin, used the English phrase ‘secret service contingent’ rather than 
referring to the Greek name ‘krypteia’. Refer to Plutarch, Cleomenes, trans. Richard J. A. Talbert, 28 for 
an alternate translation of this selection.  
14 Plutarch, Cleomenes, trans. Bernadotte Perrin, 28. To simplify matters, the part of the source that 
discusses Damoteles’ betrayal of Cleomenes by accepting a bribe from Antigonus has been omitted. It 
is unimportant, and potentially confusing, when discussing the nature which Cleomenes sought to 
utilize the krypteia as opposed to what really happened (Plut. Cleom. 28.3). 
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Damoteles, most likely to the krypteia in general since Damoteles was its commander, 
and ordered him to do reconnaissance. 
 The battle described by Plutarch was the Battle of Sellasia in Laconia.15 It is 
perhaps unfortunate that this description of the krypteia’s role in the battle happened 
to take place near Sparta. If the battle had occurred farther away, it would be a strong 
confirmation for the idea that the krypteia had a presence in the Spartan military on 
campaign. We cannot be sure if the krypteia, as a unit, traveled with the Spartan army 
abroad – given the lack of concrete evidence – but it is very plausible. It would have 
served a very practical function in the larger military because of their specialized and 
unconventional training to operate independently and clandestinely. If this was the 
case, Spartan commanders would have had an elite unit able to conduct special 
operations such as reconnaissance (as seen in Cleomenes), and possibly other functions, 
at their disposal. 
There may be another primary source that implicitly mentioned the krypteia. 
Thucydides wrote in his History of the Peloponnesian War: 
 
Indeed fear of their numbers and obstinacy even 
persuaded the Lacedaemonians to the action which I shall 
now relate, their policy at all times having been governed 
by the necessity of taking precautions against them. The 
Helots were invited by a proclamation to pick out those of 
their number who claimed to have most distinguished 
themselves against the enemy, in order that they might 
receive their freedom; the object being to test them, as it 
was thought that the first to claim their freedom would be 
the most high spirited and the most apt to rebel. 
As many as two thousand were selected accordingly, who 
crowned themselves and went round the temples, rejoicing 
in their new freedom. The Spartans, however, soon 
afterwards did away with them, and no one ever knew how 
each of them perished.16 
There has been much debate on the interpretation and veracity of this passage, but it 
is certainly plausible that, if events really did proceed similarly to how Thucydides 
described, the krypteia would have been the executor.17 If there was an instance where 
Sparta needed assassins skilled in clandestine operations, the krypteia was without a 
doubt the best available option to accomplish it. This was because of the differences 
between the institution of the krypteia and hoplite warfare. 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 27. 
16 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Richard Crawley, 4.80. 
17 Paul Cartledge, “Rebels and Sambos in Classical Greece,” in Spartan Reflections (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2001), 128-130. 
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MOUNTAINOUS VERSUS HOPLITE WARFARE 
The development of hoplite warfare in Greece was a paradoxical manner of 
fighting according to some scholars. The focus in hoplite warfare was on group 
solidarity and impenetrable defense rather than offensive mobility, speed and range; 
this made the hoplite a cumbersome, slow, but well-protected infantryman. 18 
Cartledge noted the irony that hoplite warfare, conducted on level ground by slow-
moving heavy infantry, developed in Greece where the land is predominantly 
mountainous. One would expect the emphasis to be instead on light armor, mobility 
and speed to take advantage of the terrain.19 To explain this paradox, scholars have 
referred to the agrarian nature of Greek society and that battles were fought to suit 
the interest of farmers. Hoplite warfare developed to protect agricultural property of 
the polis.20 
However, it is interesting to note that at least Sparta did have a system in 
place perfectly suited for mountainous warfare. The krypteia did not have the heavy 
armor panoply and the large, cumbersome spears of the hoplite soldiers, but only 
had daggers and basic equipment to survive. Also, they did not remain in large 
groups but dispersed into the countryside. Hoplites relied on group cohesion and the 
shield of the man next to them for protection in the open field. In contrast, the 
krypteia would have found protection in smaller numbers for concealment, greater 
speed, increased mobility and the element of surprise. Hoplites fought in broad 
daylight whereas the krypteia took advantage of the cover of darkness. In many ways 
the krypteia was diametrically opposed to hoplite warfare. It is easy to infer that the 
krypteia utilized the natural defenses of mountainous terrain to conceal their positions. 
This however leads to a debate whether the krypteia can indeed be considered military 
combatants when their methods clearly differ from the conventional military 
practices.  
 
THIS IS WAR! DECLARATION OF WARFARE BY THE EPHORS 
Plutarch stated that the ephors would declare war on the helots upon taking 
office. Since the ephors were elected annually, open warfare against the helot 
population was declared every year.21 By declaring war, the Spartan state condoned 
the slaying of the helots by the krypteia. In strictly legalistic terms, killing a helot when 
in a state of war was not murder, despite the obvious ethical considerations. 
Furthermore, in a conservative society where devotion to the state reigned supreme 
over all other values, the slaying of helots was not only considered ethical, but would 
be held as a duty in service of the state. To not kill helots would be to shy away from 
one’s responsibilities to Sparta.  
                                                 
18 Hanson, 62. 
19 Paul Cartledge, “Hoplites and Heroes: Sparta’s Contribution to the Technique of Ancient Warfare,” 
The Journal of Hellenic Studies 97 (1977): 18. 
20 Cartledge, “Hoplites and Heroes,” 22-23. Hanson, 68-75. 
21 Bonner and Smith, 113. 
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Some historians maintain that the krypteia was an early form of secret police. 
Robert J. Bonner and Gertrude Smith claimed the ephors had control over the police 
and the krypteia was a secret police force.22 A police force protects the rights of the 
state’s citizens and maintains social order. However, a police force does not require a 
declaration of war nor does it operate in a state of war.23 Comparison to the Gestapo 
further clouds the issue.24 Adolf Hitler never declared war for the Gestapo to operate, 
though he did strip citizens’ rights through the Enabling Act after coming to power 
in 1933. While Germany existed for most of Hitler’s reign in a state of war, warfare 
was declared on nations and never even formally declared against those considered 
enemies of the Nazi state, such as Marxists and Jews. 
Through this declaration of warfare, the krypteia must therefore be 
considered military combatants, not a police force as many scholars have claimed. If 
the ephors did not declare war on the helots, the krypteia would be considered a 
secret police force of murderous assassins. However, by operating within the 
confines of warfare, the krypteia were soldiers, albeit not conventional ones.  
 
KRYPTEIA: AN EARLY MODE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE 
Many aspects separate guerrilla warfare from conventional tactics. Instead of 
organized units with large numbers to present a solid front, guerrillas form into cells 
which are usually autonomous and smaller in size. Conventional campaigns utilize a 
standing army whereas guerrillas conduct hit-and-run tactics with minimal contact 
time with the enemy and then disperse after the attack. Also, conventional forces 
require supply lines; guerrillas do not. The guerrillas find an advantage in treacherous 
terrain, such as mountains and thick foliage, and conventional forces are usually 
encumbered by it. Speed and secrecy are even more important in guerrilla operations 
since they lack the numbers and defenses of a conventional army. 
Guerrilla fighting developed as a method for an inferior fighting force (in 
terms of numbers, military technology and logistics) to master a superior force. 
Thucydides noted the helot’s superior numbers with respect to the Spartans. Precise 
figures are vague but Herodotus seemed to note a seven to one ratio of helots to 
Spartans, which is a substantial difference. 25  While the Spartans had superior 
weaponry and training, the numbers were vastly in the helot’s favor. Also, the 
mountainous terrain of Greece further enhances guerrilla warfare. The tactics of the 
krypteia seem to take this knowledge into account. It is appropriate therefore to begin 
shaping an alternative view of the krypteia into one of a guerrilla force. 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 121. 
23 Modern concepts such as “the war on drugs” and “the war on terrorism” are not strictly wars and 
must not confuse the difference between the police and the military. War is a state of open conflict, 
usually declared, between states (or in the case of the helots, a group of people), not on concepts.  
24 Hanson, 80. 
25 Herodotus, The Histories, trans. Robin Waterfield, 9.10, 9.28-9.29. 
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The krypteia, as discussed previously, was an elite force of lightly-armed 
soldiers sent to fight the helots using unconventional methods. They would attack 
both day and night whereas the hoplites would only attack in daylight. They also had 
very little in the way of provided standard equipment, which would require them to 
obtain the necessary supplies by other means. The members of the krypteia would 
disperse into the countryside, most likely into small teams, rather than remain 
together as a single unit. Furthermore they would attack targets of opportunity and 
then hide using the advantages of the terrain. Not only does the nature of the krypteia 
match an emphasis on mountainous fighting, it matches the model of guerrilla 
warfare perfectly. 
It is also possible that the Spartan military took the expertise of the krypteia, 
gained through guerrilla warfare on the helots, with them on campaigns. Leonidas 
selected three hundred Spartans for the Battle at Thermopylae; it is possible that 
many were former members of the krypteia.26 Most likely these men that Leonidas 
selected were the hippeis, an elite body of three hundred men. Quite possibly the 
hippeis started as a detachment of the Spartan army, but later formed the front line of 
the phalanx when Spartan faced demographic problems.27 There exists little evidence 
linking the hippeis with the krypteia; however, it seems logical that the elite Spartan 
unit of its time would recruit its members from the elite in the educational system. 
Since the hippeis had advanced training through the tactics of the krypteia, perhaps it 
acted similarly to a Special Forces unit when it was a detachment to the Spartan army. 
Cleomenes also called upon the commander of the krypteia for a reconnaissance 
mission. With these examples it is plausible to formulate a picture of the krypteia 
supplementing the Spartan military with their knowledge on guerrilla tactics, 
mountainous fighting and the arts of observation and concealment. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The nature of the krypteia very much reflects the roots of its name. Scholars 
have debated over the function the krypteia might have truly served in Spartan society. 
The primary evidence is scarce but it is enough to get a sense of the institution. The 
description of the krypteia embraces the ideal of mountainous warfare rather than the 
way of the hoplite. Since the ephors declared war on the helots, the krypteia was a 
military organization, not a police force. Lastly, and most importantly, the founding 
principles and methods of the krypteia perfectly match the model for guerrilla warfare. 
It is plausible that the knowledge gained by the krypteia would then be utilized in 
some fashion by the Spartan military as a whole. The ways of the krypteia will always 
remain secretive and hidden from our modern eyes, but with the proper mindset we 
can discover new ideas in history to illuminate our way. 
                                                 
26 Michael A. Flower, “Simonides, Ephorus, and Herodotus on the Battle of Thermopylae,” The 
Classical Quarterly 48, no. 2 (1998): 373. 
27 Thomas J. Figueira, “Population Patterns in Late Archaic and Classical Sparta,” Transactions of the 
American Philological Association 116 (1986): 180-181. 
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